Having looked at the development
of the Catalan movement (and
particularly the turn away from
any real fight by the two main
pro-Catalan parties) it is easier to
comprehend the dynamics behind Rajoy’s sudden
end. First, partly due to the failure by the
Spanish (and Catalan) left to explain the Catalan
struggle and its progressive aspects to non-
Catalans, the main Spanish benefactor of the
crisis in Catalonia has been Ciudadanos. The
party is leading the Spanish polls for the first
time, and even if these are likely to have
exaggerated its support (as has happened in the
past), it should be remembered that C’s came
first in the December elections in Catalonia — a
major breakthrough.
The party is an odd mix of fresh-faced extreme
centrism a la Macrón, phony anti-establishment
populism a la Trump, and hard nationalism
increasingly a la Le Pen. It has a clear program to
recentralize the Spanish state (opposing the
lifting of Article 155, and planning both to
reimpose teaching in Spanish in Catalan schools
and remove the Basque Country’s tax-raising
powers).
After the Gürtel verdict, keeping the PP in office
was no longer justifiable for any of the significant
parties in Congress — including Ciudadanos
(which had given parliamentary support for the
PP to form a government). But any move sparking
early elections would likely bring about some
variant of hard-centralist government (possibly
led by C’s) that would keep enflaming the Catalan
conflict.
Both Catalan and Basque nationalists were
fearful of such a scenario and thus chose to back
Sánchez in ousting Rajoy. The Basque PNV party
did this despite having kept Rajoy afloat just
weeks before by backing his budget. Podemos
and its allies also were fearful of the continued
entrenchment of a conflict from which they do
not benefit electorally. It seems the Podemos
leadership played a key role in bringing together
the PSOE, which supported applying Article 155
and the Catalan parties that have been victims of
it.
Podemos also gains from having its main
competitor in a minority government: if the PSOE
fails to bring about change, Podemos can hope to
take votes from it later; if the PSOE does
progressive policies, Podemos hopes it will be
easy to form a left-coalition government after
new elections. This is one reason why the party
attempted to get a similar no-confidence motion
passed a year ago.
Other forces have likely aided bringing about the
cooperation between the PSOE and the parties
that supported its motion. EU leaders have
reacted positively to the change in Spain and it is
probable that they believe Sánchez to be more
capable of pacifying Catalonia. Requests by
Spanish Supreme Court judges have on several
occasions been rejected by European courts —
such as when a German court ruled that
Puigdemont had not promoted a violent rising
against the state and could not be extradited for
such. This was a rejection of the main basis for
the state’s authoritarian behavior.
Of course, the European Union opposes any
secessionism in a member state that might
encourage other national movements or add to
existing economic and political instabilities. But it
is not interested in the continuation of a conflict
that has already undermined the EU’s own
democratic legitimacy and has the potential to
evolve into a radical challenge to the status quo.
Big business has also been encouraging a new
direction. The president of the giant Santander
Bank has called for “rebuilding bridges” between
Barcelona and Madrid, and for Spain to “make all
Catalans attracted to Spain again.” Meanwhile a
Barcelona-based business lobby has proposed
that Madrid should end the conflict by offering
the Catalan government greater fiscal and other
powers. The initiative was praised by Catalan
president Torra, which will have sent the
message to Sánchez that the Generalitat is open
to a deal that falls short of a legal referendum.
The signs are that the new government in Madrid
will use both carrot and stick. Sánchez has
included right-wingers and hard unionists in its
government, such as the new interior minister
who as a judge twice jailed Arnaldo Otegi — the
pro-independence politician most responsible for
bringing about peace in the Basque country. The
new foreign minister is a unionist who called for
“disinfecting” Catalonia on a platform alongside
hard-rightists in Barcelona. Such appointments
have been welcomed by conservative
commentators and politicians and suggest that
the new government will be willing to use
despotic methods. It is telling that the new
administration has not handed back control of
Catalan public finances to the Generalitat. And
only a week before being sworn in, Sánchez
dubbed the new Catalan president a “racist” who
is “worse” than Marine Le Pen.
But since the motion of no-confidence was tabled
Sánchez has seemingly done a 180º turn, also
talking of “building bridges” with the pro-
independence Generalitat. His appointee for
minister of territorial policy is a Catalan
federalist who immediately promised an “urgent”
reform of the Spanish constitution. Sánchez has
ruled out giving Catalans self-determination but
says he will study forty-five demands previously
made by Puigdemont to Rajoy. It is difficult not to
see this strategy as interesting the pro-Catalan
liberals who need to justify abandoning creating
the Catalan Republic. Perhaps that is why the
powerful right wing of the PSOE has publicly
warned their leader about “concessions” being
made to “nationalists.” However, if Sánchez
offered the Catalan government economic and
political territorial reforms, he would be
supported by Basque Nationalists, European
leaders, and possibly Podemos and its allies. Most
importantly, the retreating pro-Catalan
movement may be willing to accept this.
There are many question marks as to whether
this strategy will be possible. The Spanish right
will now form a strong opposition, in which its
two components will compete to be the biggest
adversaries of giving “rewards” to “criminals.”
Bridges could be blown up by the judges who will
be presiding over major trials in the autumn. The
last PSOE president — Zapatero — did a U-turn
over allowing a new Catalan statute giving the
territory more powers and national status after
encountering massive establishment resistance. It
is difficult to think why Sánchez would not face
the same.
But, most crucially, the uprising that began in
Catalonia in October was not about gaining
greater fiscal powers or being recognized as a
“nation.” Those that faced police batons did so
for the right to decide which state they live in. It
might take a while, but my bet is on a powerful
movement returning — probably in a new form
and based on different alliances.
of the Catalan movement (and
particularly the turn away from
any real fight by the two main
pro-Catalan parties) it is easier to
comprehend the dynamics behind Rajoy’s sudden
end. First, partly due to the failure by the
Spanish (and Catalan) left to explain the Catalan
struggle and its progressive aspects to non-
Catalans, the main Spanish benefactor of the
crisis in Catalonia has been Ciudadanos. The
party is leading the Spanish polls for the first
time, and even if these are likely to have
exaggerated its support (as has happened in the
past), it should be remembered that C’s came
first in the December elections in Catalonia — a
major breakthrough.
The party is an odd mix of fresh-faced extreme
centrism a la Macrón, phony anti-establishment
populism a la Trump, and hard nationalism
increasingly a la Le Pen. It has a clear program to
recentralize the Spanish state (opposing the
lifting of Article 155, and planning both to
reimpose teaching in Spanish in Catalan schools
and remove the Basque Country’s tax-raising
powers).
After the Gürtel verdict, keeping the PP in office
was no longer justifiable for any of the significant
parties in Congress — including Ciudadanos
(which had given parliamentary support for the
PP to form a government). But any move sparking
early elections would likely bring about some
variant of hard-centralist government (possibly
led by C’s) that would keep enflaming the Catalan
conflict.
Both Catalan and Basque nationalists were
fearful of such a scenario and thus chose to back
Sánchez in ousting Rajoy. The Basque PNV party
did this despite having kept Rajoy afloat just
weeks before by backing his budget. Podemos
and its allies also were fearful of the continued
entrenchment of a conflict from which they do
not benefit electorally. It seems the Podemos
leadership played a key role in bringing together
the PSOE, which supported applying Article 155
and the Catalan parties that have been victims of
it.
Podemos also gains from having its main
competitor in a minority government: if the PSOE
fails to bring about change, Podemos can hope to
take votes from it later; if the PSOE does
progressive policies, Podemos hopes it will be
easy to form a left-coalition government after
new elections. This is one reason why the party
attempted to get a similar no-confidence motion
passed a year ago.
Other forces have likely aided bringing about the
cooperation between the PSOE and the parties
that supported its motion. EU leaders have
reacted positively to the change in Spain and it is
probable that they believe Sánchez to be more
capable of pacifying Catalonia. Requests by
Spanish Supreme Court judges have on several
occasions been rejected by European courts —
such as when a German court ruled that
Puigdemont had not promoted a violent rising
against the state and could not be extradited for
such. This was a rejection of the main basis for
the state’s authoritarian behavior.
Of course, the European Union opposes any
secessionism in a member state that might
encourage other national movements or add to
existing economic and political instabilities. But it
is not interested in the continuation of a conflict
that has already undermined the EU’s own
democratic legitimacy and has the potential to
evolve into a radical challenge to the status quo.
Big business has also been encouraging a new
direction. The president of the giant Santander
Bank has called for “rebuilding bridges” between
Barcelona and Madrid, and for Spain to “make all
Catalans attracted to Spain again.” Meanwhile a
Barcelona-based business lobby has proposed
that Madrid should end the conflict by offering
the Catalan government greater fiscal and other
powers. The initiative was praised by Catalan
president Torra, which will have sent the
message to Sánchez that the Generalitat is open
to a deal that falls short of a legal referendum.
The signs are that the new government in Madrid
will use both carrot and stick. Sánchez has
included right-wingers and hard unionists in its
government, such as the new interior minister
who as a judge twice jailed Arnaldo Otegi — the
pro-independence politician most responsible for
bringing about peace in the Basque country. The
new foreign minister is a unionist who called for
“disinfecting” Catalonia on a platform alongside
hard-rightists in Barcelona. Such appointments
have been welcomed by conservative
commentators and politicians and suggest that
the new government will be willing to use
despotic methods. It is telling that the new
administration has not handed back control of
Catalan public finances to the Generalitat. And
only a week before being sworn in, Sánchez
dubbed the new Catalan president a “racist” who
is “worse” than Marine Le Pen.
But since the motion of no-confidence was tabled
Sánchez has seemingly done a 180º turn, also
talking of “building bridges” with the pro-
independence Generalitat. His appointee for
minister of territorial policy is a Catalan
federalist who immediately promised an “urgent”
reform of the Spanish constitution. Sánchez has
ruled out giving Catalans self-determination but
says he will study forty-five demands previously
made by Puigdemont to Rajoy. It is difficult not to
see this strategy as interesting the pro-Catalan
liberals who need to justify abandoning creating
the Catalan Republic. Perhaps that is why the
powerful right wing of the PSOE has publicly
warned their leader about “concessions” being
made to “nationalists.” However, if Sánchez
offered the Catalan government economic and
political territorial reforms, he would be
supported by Basque Nationalists, European
leaders, and possibly Podemos and its allies. Most
importantly, the retreating pro-Catalan
movement may be willing to accept this.
There are many question marks as to whether
this strategy will be possible. The Spanish right
will now form a strong opposition, in which its
two components will compete to be the biggest
adversaries of giving “rewards” to “criminals.”
Bridges could be blown up by the judges who will
be presiding over major trials in the autumn. The
last PSOE president — Zapatero — did a U-turn
over allowing a new Catalan statute giving the
territory more powers and national status after
encountering massive establishment resistance. It
is difficult to think why Sánchez would not face
the same.
But, most crucially, the uprising that began in
Catalonia in October was not about gaining
greater fiscal powers or being recognized as a
“nation.” Those that faced police batons did so
for the right to decide which state they live in. It
might take a while, but my bet is on a powerful
movement returning — probably in a new form
and based on different alliances.
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