Catalonia’s Hot Autumn

In October, Madrid suspended

Catalan self-government after a pro-
independence parliament declared
independence — itself in response
to the repression against a
referendum it had been forced to call
unilaterally. Catalan leaders were imprisoned or
driven into exile, leading Rajoy’s deputy Soraya
Sáenz de Santamaría to boast that they had
“decapitated” the movement. After pro-
independence parties won the December
“regional” elections imposed by Madrid, the state
blocked Carles Puigdemont from returning from
exile to be Catalan president. Furthermore, it
blocked the reappointment of Catalan ministers
for helping hold the referendum. Meanwhile the
courts began persecuting the grassroots
committees (CDRs) set up to defend the process.
Though Sánchez made semi-critical remarks
about the police violence, the leader backed all of
the subsequent authoritarian measures against
the Catalan movement and even recently aired
his view that the law should be tightened against
those unilaterally attempting independence.
The Catalan movement showed in strength on
October 1 — managing successfully (due to the
actions of the CDRs) to keep most of the polling
stations open despite state attacks. It flexed its
muscle again during the general strike two days
later. Yet, since then, it has suffered defeats. One
of the state’s few successes on the day of the vote
was to diminish turnout (by scaring off voters
and confiscating ballot boxes in some areas). A
tactical mistake by the Catalan government
(Generalitat) was not to instruct its own police
force — the Mossos — to disobey legal orders or
encourage supporters to obstruct the Mossos
from entering stations. The force was divided that
day and generally played no role in the violence,
but in some areas their soft approach allowed
ballots to be taken. Consequently the size of the
“yes” votes collected did not confirm to everyone
that the Generalitat had a democratic mandate to
push through independence — even though a
convincing calculation suggested that a majority
had voted in favor of a new state.
This led to difficulties when the Catalan
government moved to declare independence:
first, a significant layer of Catalans that had
mobilized for the referendum and against police
violence peeled away from active protest, unsure
of the movement’s democratic case. Second, for
the first time since the Catalan “sovereignty
process” began, “pro-unionist” forces managed to
mobilize considerable numbers of pro-Spanish
Catalans in street protests.