The 2018 Presidential elections in Colombia show several
particularities in comparison with past elections. For the
first time, a dispute between economic and political
models was not as strong as usual because, for the first
time in Colombia’s history, a leftist candidate went to the
second round and became a feasible alternative. In
addition, for the first time in 50 years the presidential poll
was free of the threat of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC in Spanish), so the candidates’
proposals went beyond the fight against terrorism.
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Colombia, where the vote is not compulsory, has one of
the highest abstention levels of the world, traditionally
above 50% in the last 20 years, the two exceptions were
the elections of 1998 and 2018, when more than half of
the electoral registration participated. In the 2014
elections, the abstention levels were 59.35% and 52.03%
in the first and in the second round, respectively. In the
2018 elections, abstention levels decreased to 46.62% in
the first round and 46.96% in the second round. However,
in the second round, there was no significant increase in
the levels of electoral participation, unlike in the previous
elections four years ago. The blank vote grew from 1.76%
in the first round to 4.20% in the second round but is still
lower than in the past elections (5.98% and 4.02% in the
first and the second rounds, respectively).
This article analyses the 2018 presidential elections in
Colombia, the main expected tensions in Duque’s
government and the future of the peace process.
The Return of the Right vs. the Emergence of Alternative
Options
In the first round, the rightist candidate Iván Duque
received 39.14% of the votes, the leftist Gustavo Petro
25.08%, the candidate for the center Sergio Fajardo
23.73% and the other two candidates, obtained less than
10%. In this way, Duque and Petro went to the second
round, and Fajardo, with a very small difference of votes
in relation to Petro, came out of the election contest, but
the votes he received demonstrated the force of a center
option and their anti-political and anti-polarization
speech.
On one side, there was Gustavo Petro who was a
member of the M-19 guerrilla in his youth. The 19th of
April Movement (M-19 in Spanish) aimed to open up
democracy in Colombia. Initially, the guerrilla had a failed
attempt of armed revolutionary struggle, but thereafter
managed a reincorporation into civil society and political
life. This fact, together with the past affinity of Petro with
Hugo Chávez, was used by his detractors to justify the
possibility that Colombia might become a “second
Venezuela”, just like Uribism’s argument.
In the senate, Gustavo Petro exposed the Parapolitics
scandal, accusing congressmen and other politicians who
were followers of Uribe’s government of mingling with
paramilitary groups. Petro accused even the then
president Alvaro Uribe of paramilitary ties. In 2010, Petro
was one of the presidential candidates, obtaining fourth
place in the total votes. Moreover, Petro was Mayor of
Bogotá between 2012 and 2015 but was removed from
his seat for four months because of disciplinary
investigations related to problems in the implementation
of the waste collection system in the city. Petro has
more progressive proposals in issues like environment
protection, LGBT rights and social policies, also he has
defended the peace process, so the continuity of the
peace agreements was not contested.
On the other hand, there was the lawyer Iván Duque of
the Democratic Center, Uribe’s party.
It should be recalled that Colombia’s political reality in
the 21st century must be understood from the end of
bipartisanship and the consolidation of Uribism like a
political trend but also for the emergence of other
alternative political forces from the left and the center
sectors. By this way, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who was
president between 2002 and 2010, succeeded in
consolidating a political force founded on conservative
ideas and economic liberalism, and the policy of
Democratic security, based on the government’s struggle
against illegal armed groups, like the guerrillas. For that
reason, and a broad support from military sectors,
entrepreneurs, and a large proportion of the population,
he is considered the most powerful politician in
Colombia.
Juan Manuel Santos, Colombian president between
2010-2018, was the former Defense Minister in Uribe’s
administration and was supported by the ex-president in
the 2010 elections, but when Santos began the peace
process with the FARC, Uribe moved to the opposition. In
2013, Uribe founded the Democratic Center party, with
which he was elected senator in 2014 and re-elected in
the 2018 parliamentary elections. Ivan Duque, a little-
known political figure into Uribism, was also a senator for
that period.
Despite the fact that the victory of Santos in 2014 took
power away from Uribism, Uribe, as senator and the main
opponent of Santos and his party, managed to gain the
second largest vote in the parliamentary elections of that
year and in the 2018 elections. The Democratic Center
was the party which received the most votes and Uribe
the senator with the highest number of votes. The power
of Uribism and its opposition to the FARC was also
reinforced in the plebiscite of 2016, the consultation to
ratify the final agreement on the termination of the
Colombian conflict between the government and the
FARC guerillas. The NO option, which’s campaign was led
by Uribism, was the winner by a short difference to the
YES (0,43%) in a controversial campaign, whereby
Uribism used lies and fear as a strategy. The opposition
to the FARC’s party was evidenced in legislative
elections, when no FARC´s candidates were elected.
In that sense, Uribe was considered an obstacle to peace
in Colombia . The opposition alleged impunity in the
peace process, especially about the mechanism of
Transitional justice, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
(JEP in Spanish).
In the legislative elections, on March 11, 2018, the right
coalition did a query. Duque won with a significant
number of votes. At the time, the Democratic Center was
the most voted party and had more senators.
In this respect, Uribism recovered strength with the
plebiscite and the legislative elections. It went from being
a minority force against the peace to achieving important
support around Duque. Accordingly, after the first-round,
many parties joined the right-wing candidate, including
the leader of the liberal party, the former president César
Gaviria, paradoxically the head of the YES campaign of
the plebiscite in 2016 and a strong critic of the Uribe’s
position about the peace process. The partisan support
became an important weapon in favor of Duque.
Duque is Ivan Duque Escobar’s son, who was Antioquia’s
governor, Minister of Mines and Development, and
National Civil Registrar. Duque worked at the Inter-
American Development Bank and was a senator between
2014 and 2018 with a low profile within the Democratic
Center, consequently he was an unknown figure in
Colombian politics until a couple of years ago. Duque has
been criticized by the opposition because of his lack of
experience in public administration in comparison to the
other four candidates in the first-round. For this reason,
the opposition calls him “Uribe’s puppet” since he
achieved the candidacy and went to the second round
because of the fact of being chosen by Uribe.
Duque has been introduced as a young candidate able to
address the renovation in the Colombian politics. But he
represents the return of “Uribism” to power and the
opportunity to modify the peace agreement signed
between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC in Spanish) and the government of Juan Manuel
Santos. During the election campaign, Duque has shown
conservative positions on themes such as abortion and
equal marriage, the defense of the mining activity, and
did few mentions about education policies in comparison
to Petro and Fajardo.
Contrary to the broad support of the right, center and left
parties were divided between supporting Petro or voting
blank. Fajardo and De la Calle decided to vote blank
despite some approximations. It was not possible to
make a coalition among three candidates, unlike the right
that brought together the traditional political class, such
as former Presidents Gaviria, Pastrana and, obviously,
Uribe. It buried the possibility of a direct support to Petro
and crystallized the division among alternative sectors
and its voters.
Given Duque’s refusal to participate in electoral debates
in the second round with Petro, there was not a chance
to know better Duque’s arguments. In addition, while
Petro was questioned by journalists about his
administration as Mayor of Bogotá, a part of the
Colombian mass media demonstrated some sympathy
with Duque.
Tensions and Worries about Duque’s Victory
In the second round, Duque obtained 53.98% and Petro
41.81%, which made him the most voted president of the
Colombian history and the youngest president of the
contemporary history.
After Duque’s victory, there are two key questions: what
will the role of the “Eternal President”, as Duque called
Uribe in a political meeting in Medellín in March 2018, be
in the new government? And what will be the future of
the peace process in the country?
On one side, it is important to remember that Colombia’s
Supreme Court is investigating Uribe over three
massacres and one homicide. There have been several
accusations linking the former president to paramilitary
groups, and his involvement in the massacres and
attempts to silence witnesses. However, on several
occasions during the election campaign, Duque came out
in Uribe’s defense when he was asked whether, in case
of becoming president, he would respect the
investigations against the former president. Nevertheless,
Uribe has also been accused of alleged links with drug
trafficking, for instance, declassified US cables link Uribe
to Colombian drug cartels when he was Antioquia’s
governor . As a result, there are concerns of Uribism
using its return to power to hinder progress in criminal
investigations against Uribe.
Unless Duque achieves an autonomous government,
direct influence of Uribe is expected in domestic and
foreign policy.
In his victory speech, Duque had a conciliatory tone and
raised several issues about the fight against corruption,
poverty reduction, health care reform, environmental
care, security, and many others. Duque has had a more
moderate speech, criticizing the polarization in the
country between the right and the left and friends and
enemies of peace. Nevertheless, it should be
remembered that Uribe’s position has been radical on
topics like the fight against armed groups and the peace
process. As well, it seems contradictory that Duque has
prioritized the fight against corruption in his speech when
several political parties that supported his candidature are
involved in disciplinary and judicial investigations for
corruption, relationship with armed groups, and other
crimes. Likewise, Duque has defended Uribe’s
government officials who are being prosecuted or
investigated by the justice authorities, for example the
former Minister of Agriculture, Andrés Felipe Arias.
Regarding foreign policy, it is not clear the orientation of
Duque’s administration, but a return of a foreign policy
aligned to the United States is possible, as happened
during Uribe’s administration. For instance, Duque opened
the possibility of relocation of the Colombian Embassy in
Israel to Jerusalem following Trump’s decision. Equally, it
is expected a harder position about the Venezuelan
government, being the growing migration of Venezuelan
people one of the most important issues that the new
government must deal with. In fact, the Venezuelan crisis
and its external consequences, has impacted Colombian
domestic policy and even the elections results, for
instance with the argument that Colombia could become
another Venezuela if the left came to power.
Duque, unlike Petro, will have better governability because
besides the parliamentary caucus of the Democratic
Center, there is the added political support of other
parties obtained after the first round. Nevertheless, the
elected President will probably have the opposition of the
parties of the center and the left, who were strengthened
in this election, led by Petro, who will be senator.
Similarly, an active opposition is expected, specially by
human rights defenders, environmentalists, and some
society sectors like social leaders, victims of the conflict,
teachers, public university students, among others.
The Peace Process: From Hope to Incertitude
The peace agreement, as a result of the negotiation
between the Colombian government and the FARC since
2012, include strategies for rural development, political
participation of the FARC’s members, solution to the
problem of illicit drugs and reparation for victims (with
the creation of the Truth Commission, search unit for
missing people, Special Jurisdiction for Peace and
mechanisms of sanctions and punishments, reparations,
and non-repetition). Also, the agreement is about the end
of the bilateral conflict and achieve a definite ceasefire,
the creation of a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism,
the transitory rural settlement normalization zones and
encampments, decommissioning, reincorporation of the
FARC with transformation into a political party and
security guarantees for FARC’s members.
Although the peace agreement’s implementation is facing
different difficulties, the military option has had high
human and social costs, as has been noted during Uribe’s
government. Indeed, statistics show that the peace
agreement has reduced violent events in Colombia. The
number of injuries, weapons, deaths, displacements,
threats, and mines have since declined considerably .
However, the killings of FARC’s former members, the
systematic murder of social leaders – despite that the
Santos government does not recognize the severity of
this problem – the violent actions of dissident groups, are
extremely worrying. Likewise, the implementation of the
agreement has problems like those associated with
resources management and compliance with some
points of the peace agreements. For that reason, many
people are concerned about the future of the peace
process in Colombia and the possible return of the
military option.
There is no doubt that some sectors of the Democratic
Center Party want to destroy the peace agreement. In any
case, it is probable that the new president, who has the
majority in Congress, will modify some points of the
agreement. Even though, a guarantee of the continuity of
the peace process is that the agreement is protected by
the Constitutional Court, it is important to remember that
in Uribe’s first administration the Constitution was
modified so he could be reelected.
Duque said that the peace agreement’s implementation
has different problems and, in his victory speech,
asserted that he will not destroy the agreements with the
FARC guerrilla, but that he will modify it in order to
ensure security and justice in the country.
For this reason, there might be possible modifications of
the precepts in the Constitution that introduced the
peace agreements and their regulation laws that might
lead to the weakening of the process. The FARC leaders,
who clarified that they will not return to war, asked the
new president to continue the implementation of the
agreement and proposed a meeting with Duque.
But the continuation of negotiations between the
government and the National Liberation Army (ELN in
Spanish), which has gone through several ups and downs,
generates special concern. The dialogues between
Colombian government and ELN rebels was initiated in
Quito in February of 2017 and were finished the fifth
round of the Roundtable of Dialogues for Peace in
Havana in June of 2018 without achieving the bilateral
ceasefire. The negotiation includes discussions about
social participation, democracy, victims, transformations
for the peace, peace security, surrendering of arms and
guarantees for the political action.
About the ELN negotiations, Duque has said that he
disagrees with the negotiations with the ELN guerrilla of a
bilateral ceasefire, but he announced that even with the
ELN ceasefire he will not continue with the negotiations
at the Havana if the guerrilla does not fulfil new
conditions like territorial concentration and suspension of
all “criminal activities”, such as extortion. In turn, ELN
members have asked to continue with the negotiations .
In any case, if Duque insists in penalizing the guerrilla
members, it will be very difficult to continue this peace
process.
In conclusion, with the right recovering strength, and
Uribe being once more one of the most powerful
politicians of the country, with a disciple in the
presidency and the majorities of his party in the
Congress, and the support of a big percentage of the
Colombian society governability is guaranteed, but the
power will be concentrated. Also, it is uncertain whether
Duque will be able to govern without the direct influence
of Uribe. On the other hand, opposition from advocates
of the peace agreements is expected if Duque decides to
modify essential parts of the agreement and there are
serious concerns about the return of Uribe’s policies and
impunity in Uribe’s investigations in cases such as of
extrajudicial executions during his government.
